The Role of Law and Lawyers under the New Multilateral Trade Agreements by Herzstein, Robert E
THE ROLE OF LAW AND LAWYERS
UNDER THE NEW MULTILATERAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS
by Robert E. Herzstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
Integration of the economies of non-Communist nations is pro-
ceeding at an increasingly rapid rate. Dramatic changes are occur-
ring in the patterns of productive enterprise around the globe.
These developments are partly a result of United States leader-
ship in a series of international trade-liberalizing initiatives that
began with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Partly
they result from developments in technology, living standards,
and population that have made most of the nations of the western
world deeply dependent on one another for economic essentials.
Trade-liberalizing programs have created business opportunities
and international divisions of labor which serve to bind nations
together. The growth of these new business activities has in turn
confirmed the effectiveness of the trade-liberalizing measures,
stimulated more of them, and made us all dependent on their suc-
cess.
A major new move toward further economic integration was
achieved in the agreements reached during the latest Multilateral
Trade Negotiations. The current agreements are of extraordinary
importance, not because they bring further progress in the forty-
five-year effort to eliminate tariff barriers, but because, for the
first time since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was
established thirty-one years ago, the major trading nations have
reconfirmed the role of law in creating the structure-the system
of mutual expectations -essential for liberal and open trade.
The importance of legal rules in establishing the regularity and
predictability businesses need for successful long-term operations
was recognized in 1947, when the GATT was written as a series of
rules governing the conduct of nations affecting the flow of trade.
But since that time the trade-liberalizing efforts of the GATT na-
tions have been focused principally on reducing tariff rates.
Respect for the rules set forth in the General Agreement has
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seriously eroded.1 The result has been that, though tariffs are
much lower and the volume of trade has greatly increased,
achievement of an open and competitive trading environment
among participating nations has been frustrated by a variety of
government practices which inhibit competition from foreign
enterprises and aid home enterprises, both in holding their home
markets and gaining sales abroad.
The new rules, expressed in ten codes negotiated in Geneva
during the past five years, are designed to establish a broader and
more effective international regime which will prevent nations
from taking certain kinds of action that distort the flow of trade
from what it would be were it free to perform in accordance with
comparative economic advantage. The new codes are, in my view,
likely to have a dramatic effect on the work of lawyers for busi-
ness enterprises.2 The codes, and the legislation implementing
them, will have an impact on a vast range of business transactions
not presently affected by international trading rules. As imports
and exports play an increasing role in our national economy, the
new rules will take their place alongside other regulatory pro-
grams as major factors for businessmen to consider in designing
investment, production, and marketing programs.
The new rules may present a level of complexity not present in
most domestic regulatory legislation. Enforcement of the rules
governing United States business activity, though imposed as a
result of implementing legislation adopted by Congress, will in
some degree be influenced by international rules set forth in the
codes and by interpretations of these rules by international dis-
pute settlement bodies. The international rules may also develop
further as a result of continuing negotiations likely to be author-
ized soon by Congress. Such changes would in turn be implemented
by further domestic legislation. Thus the lawyer will have to deal
with two sets of continually evolving rules.'
See Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of International Trade, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L.
93, 96-98.
There will also be a significant new role for government lawyers in enforcing the codes,
negotiating changes and new codes, and perhaps eventually in building a sound body of in-
ternational institutions for helping to administer the codes and resolve disputes. However,
that role must be the subject of a separate article.
' Still more levels of lawmaking and interpretation may be involved. In working with the
important new Code on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards), lawyers will have to con-
cern themselves not only with the international rules and domestic implementing legisla-
tion, but also with the impact of these new international and federal rules on state and local
laws and industry agreements, which establish the industrial standards governed by the
new Code.
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Further challenge for the business lawyer will result from the
fact that his client's ability to sell products in foreign countries
will also be affected by the new codes and the international inter-
pretations of them, as well as by the implementing legislation of
foreign countries.
In the following pages I will discuss the new sources of law that
lawyers will have to become familiar with and the new proceed-
ings they may become involved in-in short, the challenges law-
yers will face in the effort to counsel and defend clients in a period
of great change and uncertainty for international business. But
the significance of the discussion will go beyond the subject of
new demands for the lawyer's already overtaxed energies. It is
also important to indicate how and why these new challenges are
worthwhile, and how the special skills of lawyers can serve to
build a framework of rules within which international trade can
flow according to economic principles rather than in response to
assertions of national power.
II. TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE TRADE LAWYER
As a basis for appraising the impact of the new codes and imple-
menting legislation on law and lawyers, it is useful to take a brief
look at the functions lawyers have filled previously in working
with international trade agreements and related United States
legislation.
During the four decades that the reciprocal trade agreements
program has been in effect, the lawyer's role in private businesses
has been rather limited. The main objective of the program has
been to reduce the level of import duties imposed by the principal
trading nations. Government negotiators performed this task. The
lawyer for a business enterprise affected favorably or unfavorably
by proposed tariff reductions might present his client's views to
the Executive Branch or to Congress. In this work, the lawyer
contributed little other than his skills of orderly factual presenta-
tion and political persuasion, skills which nonlawyers also possess.
Private lawyers have also had occasion to represent business in-
terests in "escape clause" or "safeguard" cases, in which the
government was called upon to decide whether imports of a given
article had increased in such a way as to meet certain statutory
criteria. If the criteria were met, the law allowed the United
States to impose temporary import restrictions to permit United
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States industry adjustment to changing competitive conditions.
The private lawyer ordinarily based his fact presentations and his
arguments on a standard set forth in the statute. In hearings held
by the United States Tariff Commission and its successor, the In-
ternational Trade Commission, the lawyer enjoyed a limited op-
portunity to face his opposition and to focus attention on the
critical issues. But the importance of a lawyer's skills has always
been tempered by several features of these proceedings. First,
the parties to a controversy could not have access to the full
record developed by the Commission in its investigation.5 Second,
the Commission's decisions, over the years, failed to develop
coherent doctrines or lines of reasoning which could provide
precedent or guidance in planning future conduct or deciding
future cases. And third, after all was said and done in the Commis-
sion, if the decision was that the statutory criteria for import-
relief had been met, the President made the ultimate decision
whether to impose an import restriction under a broad "national
interest" standard. This fact has tended to cause the decision-
makers, the parties, and counsel to regard the tasks of making
disciplined findings of fact and defining clear standards of decision
as less important than influencing the overriding politics of a case.
Private lawyers have also had a limited number of opportuni-
19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53. Such proceedings are contemplated by Article XIX of the GATT.
According to the docket numbers of the proceedings conducted by the International Trade
Commission, and its predecessor the Tariff Commission, thirty-eight of these proceedings
arose under the current version of United States law, contained in the Trade Act of 1974.
There were twenty-nine proceedings under the preceding version, enacted in the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962 and there were 112 proceedings prior to 1962 under section 7 of the
Trade Agreements Extension Act, which first introduced escape clause proceedings in
1951.
' The Commission has traditionally viewed the participation of interested businesses and
their counsel merely as a part of an investigation conducted independently by the Commis-
sion through its large staff. Extensive economic data collected by the staff have not nor-
mally been made available to interested parties, though in recent years a summary of some
of the data has been made available. Questioning of adverse witnesses has been permitted,
but the commissioners grow impatient with detailed or extensive cross-examination. Until
recently, the Commission allowed interested members of Congress (usually, of course, from
the home state or district of the domestic industry involved in the proceeding) to testify at
the beginning of the hearing, and to be immune from cross-examination.
In keeping with its view of the nature of the hearing as one part of an overall investiga-
tion, and not the occasion where the exclusive record for decision is made, the Commission
does not formally recognize lawyers in their distinct role as advocates. It allows nonlawyers
to represent parties in the hearings. (U have observed at least one who did quite a credit-
able job.) It also requires lawyers to be sworn in along with the witnesses they are present-
ing. Contrary to the expectations of some, this practice has neither crimped the lawyers'
style nor improved the usefulness of their rhetoric.
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ties to represent clients in cases under the countervailing duty
law' (which imposes offsetting duties on United States imports
that benefit from a foreign government subsidy) and the anti-
dumping statute' (which imposes special duties to offset foreign
sales in the United States at "less than fair value").
Activity under the countervailing duty law was extremely
limited until enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, since the deci-
sion whether to proceed with an investigation and make a deter-
mination under this Act was left to the discretion of the Secretary
of the Treasury. Policy or political reasons often made it expedi-
ent for the Secretary to leave a case open, with essentially no ac-
tion being taken for years. The statute required the Secretary to
impose countervailing duties whenever he determined the ex-
istence of a foreign bounty or grant benefiting exports to the
United States. However, the duty to make these tough decisions,
and to establish adequate administrative procedures for doing so,
was effectively avoided for almost eighty years by the simple
technique of discretionary inaction. From 1934 to 1969, for exam-
ple, only about two hundred investigations were processed.' Since
the Trade Act of 1974 placed mandatory time limits on the
Secretary, approximately seventy-five new proceedings have been
commenced and thirty previously pending cases disposed of."
Decisions in antidumping cases were not so easily avoided, and
over eight hundred cases have been filed and decided since the
statute was enacted in 1921.10
Both countervailing duty and antidumping cases would appear
to have called for extensive and refined use of legal skills. Both
kinds of proceedings require the collection, analysis, and presenta-
tion of highly complex facts relating to business transactions.
Both also call for interpretation and application of broad statutory
criteria to individual cases in a systematic fashion." In both kinds
- 19 U.S.C. § 1303.
' 19 U.S.C. H 160-66.
o HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 91ST CONG., 2) SESS., SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE
TARIFF AND TRADE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND RELATED MATERIALS 148 (Comm. Print
1970).
* This calculation is based on a record maintained in the author's office.
, This estimate is calculated from the 684 complaints filed between January 1, 1921 and
October 31, 1966 (1 SENATE FINANCE COMM., 90TH CONG. 2D SESS., COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS
ON LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT REVIEW OF U.S. TRADE POLICIES 176 (Comm. Print 1968)), and
the approximately one hundred complaints filed from 1972 to date (according to a record of
cases maintained in the author's office).
" In addition, in antidumping cases, it has been necessary for The International Trade
Commission to conduct an investigation into whether an industry in the United States is be-
1979]
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of proceedings, the lawyer's talent for insuring fair and rational
decisionmaking procedures would have been every bit as appro-
priate as it has been in other administrative proceedings when
government officials make determinations under statutory cri-
teria which affect private interests. But the fact is that disciplined
administrative proceedings that make full use of the fact-gather-
ing and analytical skills of lawyers for the affected parties have
not been developed under these statutes. Factual conclusions have
not been documented by reference to a proper record of evidence.
Legal interpretations have not been supported by careful reason-
ing based on the legislation and previous decisions.
Perhaps part of the reason for the primitive state of adminis-
trative procedure under these statutes has been the feeling of
Treasury Department officials that they must retain an unusually
high amount of discretion because of the international impact of
their decisions. In large part, however, I believe informal and un-
disciplined procedures have resulted from a severe shortage of
judicial review.12
In addition to the above proceedings, there have been a few oc-
casions for lawyers to represent business interests in adminis-
ing or is likely to be "injured" and whether the injury is "by reason of" imports at less than
fair value. These cases, therefore, call for consideration of broad economic data and expert
opinion testimony rather like that commonly presented by antitrust trial lawyers.
" Judicial review of antidumping decisions adverse to the importer has been discouraged
in most cases by the long wait required after the dumping determination while the amount
of special dumping duties was assessed. This wait serves no purpose in the judicial review,
and is required only by jurisdictional technicalities. 19 U.S.C. §§ 168, 169; 28 U.S.C. § 1582.
See J.C. Penney Co. v. U.S. Treasury Dept., 439 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1971); cerL denied 404 U.S.
869 (1973); Matsushita Electric Ind. v. U.S. Treasury Dep't, 60 C.C.P.A. 85 (1973); cert.
denied 404 U.S. 21 (1973). But it leads most importers and foreign industry interests
adversely affected by dumping determinations to accommodate them rather than seek
review, which would provide relief only after competitive battles had been lost. Judicial
review of antidumping decisions adverse to the domestic industry-i.e., negative determi-
nations- has been discouraged by the courts' refusal to review in any way the legal or fac-
tual correctness of a decision, so long as the Treasury follows the appropriate procedures.
See Orlowitz v. United States, 43 Cust. Ct. 548 (1959), aff'd 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961),
aff'd 50 C.C.P.A. 36 (1963). Judicial review in countervailing duty cases has been discourag-
ed by the Treasury Department's habit, referred to above, of postponing for years ad-
ministrative action -especially in cases likely to lead to a positive determination. When
Treasury entered a negative determination, the domestic industry which had petitioned for
relief found that it had no right to judicial review. United States v. Hammond Lead Pro-
ducts, 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971). See Berger, Judicial Review of Countervailing Duty
Determinations, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 593 (1978); Gerhart, Judicial Review of Customs Ser-
vice Actions, 9 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 1101 (1977). Even though the countervailing duty law
has been in force for eighty years, judicial review has been so inadequate that the question
of the scope of review remains unsettled. See ASG Industries v. United States, 467 F.
Supp. 1200 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
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trative proceedings under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974's
and its predecessor statute (concerning "unjustifiable," "unrea-
sonable," and "discriminatory" trade practices of foreign govern-
ments): approximately twenty-five cases;" Section 22 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (permitting restrictions on
imports of agricultural products which threaten a domestic price
support program): forty-one cases; import quota negotiations
under Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956;5 and Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and its predecessor stat-
utes (concerning import restrictions needed for national security
reasons): approximately thirty-five cases.'" But to a great degree
the governmental determinations reached at the end of all these
proceedings are discretionary. Though lawyers have been helpful
in supplementing the government's information, they have nor-
mally not been able to play a significant role in insuring that
determinations were reached in a factually supported manner and
in accordance with reasoned legal conclusions, following disci-
plined administrative proceedings."
In addition to the above domestic statutes governing interna-
tional trade with the United States, there are also international
rules established in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
The GATT rules might have provided a fruitful basis for the exer-
cise of one distinctive and valuable lawyer's skill-the develop-
19 U.S.C. § 2411.
" Personal communication with staff members of the Office of the Special Representa-
tive for Trade Negotiations.
" In the absence of administrative regulations for petitioning under this provision, it is
difficult to cite an exact number of cases. The negotiating powers under section 204 have
only been involved with respect to a very few products: agreements on meat imports and
bilateral textile agreements were negotiated under the authority of this section. See HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG. 1ST SESS., BRIEFING MATERIALS PREPARED FOR THE
USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS IN CONNECTION WITH HEARINGS ON THE SUBJECT
OF FORERGN TRADE AND TARIFFS 253 (Comm. Print 1973).
,1 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 91ST CONG. 2D SESS., SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE
TARIFF AND TRADE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND RELATED MATERIALS 104-05 (Comm.
Print 1970) and personal communication with the individual responsible for the administra-
tion of this statute from 1965 to 1973 in the Office for Emergency Planning and from 1973 to
1977 in the Treasury Department.
" The lawyer's role has been somewhat more important in one class of cases, those which
arise under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, concerning "unfair
methods of competition and unfair acts" involving imports (128 cases). The portion of the
proceeding which takes place in the International Trade Commission is conducted under
normal rules for adjudicatory hearings, including pleadings, prehearing discovery, and a
hearing on the record before a presiding officer. In addition, many of these cases involve ar-
cane questions of patent law, as to which the deciding agency is more dependent on presen-
tations by private lawyers.
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ment, on a case-by-case basis, of legal doctrines and lines of
reasoning which can enlighten and clarify questions arising in the
future. But they did not. Disputes concerning GATT obligations
arise between governments, and a tendency has developed in re-
cent years among participating governments to regard GATT
rules not as rules of law, but more as general principles which can
serve as the starting point for negotiation and compromise when
disputes arise. Controversies have been bargained away, with the
result turning little on the meaning or purpose of the rule and
largely on the congeries of existing political and economic rela-
tionships between the two countries.
The GATT rules have thus not in practice served as rules of
general applicability which provide a basis for predicting the con-
duct of others and planning one's own conduct. They have worked
more like provisions in a contract between two parties, where
each has something of an interest in keeping the good will of the
other, but where there is no effective outside enforcement and
each is more or less free to re-bargain the meaning of the contract
whenever it wishes on the basis of how much each needs the other
at that time. The private lawyer has had to know about or "use"
the rules of the GATT only in a few specialized kinds of situa-
tions."
III. FUTURE ROLE OF LAWYERS
This very sketchy background provides a starting point for
evaluating the potential impact on private lawyers of the new sets
of rules and the decisionmaking proceedings that will be estab-
lished in the MTN codes and implementing legislation.
Many of the codes are efforts at regulating diverse and some-
times complex areas of government behavior which, in turn, affect
complex patterns of trade. They contain some novel concepts.
Their Delphic phrases and sometimes turgid style indicate that
the negotiators have used general and ambiguous language to
" He might participate in a proceeding before the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411, in which the
question would be whether a foreign nation had violated GATT commitments to the United
States and whether the President should exercise his discretion to negotiate with, or retali-
ate against, the nation involved. Or the lawyer might refer to GATT rules when addressing
arguments to the discretion of the Executive Branch or Congress, where he might urge
that a contemplated course of government action would be inconsistent with the GATT,
and therefore cause the United States embarrassment or difficulty with its trading part-
ners.
[Vol. 9:177
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achieve agreements in principle where there was disagreement on
the operational details.
One cannot hope for too much clarity or precision in the im-
plementing legislation either, since the entire implementing bill
covering all the codes, and any other subjects which are con-
sidered necessary or desirable to equip the United States Govern-
ment to carry out its MTN commitments, is being written in a
very few months. Once introduced, the legislation will have to be
approved or disapproved by Congress without amendment. Thus
we will soon be presented with the results of two extraordinary
and unprecedented lawmaking efforts, one at the international
level and one from our own Congress. At this early stage, it is not
possible to predict concretely or confidently the consequences of
these new rules, for lawyers or for anyone else, including in-
dustries and nations. One can only make some informed guesses,
such as those which follow.
The MTN codes and implementing legislation will mark the
beginning of a distinct new phase in the regulation of trade among
nations. We will see a new ordering of production and marketing
activities in the industries that serve international markets. If the
codes are effective in establishing rules of general applicability,
they will in the course of a few years bring into harmony some of
the divergent practices of* national governments, local govern-
ments, and industries which at present serve to inhibit open and
competitive trade.
Lawyers could play a crucial role in building this new system of
rules. They would counsel clients on how to conduct their
businesses within the rules and help them uncover and secure
preventive action against violations by their competitors. More
importantly, the lawyers-and only the lawyers-would insure
that the actions of government officials in implementing the inter-
national rules are carried out fairly and objectively. Ad-
ministrative proceedings disciplined by lawyers are the only
technique yet devised for assuring business enterprises, workers,
consumers, and others that government decisions affecting them
are based on a careful consideration of all material facts and a
reasoned and consistent interpretation of the rules, expressed in a
public explanation which provides guidance for future cases.
But the new codes may not work this way in practice. Instead of
establishing rules of general applicability within which business
enterprises can operate, the codes might evolve in a way which
19791
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simply expands the role of central government administrations in
individual commercial decisions. This would happen if govern-
ments do not seek to conform their practices rigorously to the
codes but instead act according to economic expediency and, when
the action is inconsistent with the codes, seek to bargain away any
complaints of noncompliance, reaching compromise arrangements
that mollify the complainant without correcting the offending
practice. Government action in these instances is, of necessity,
broadly discretionary. Thus there is less room for lawyers to play
a role in insuring fair and objective government decisions. The
only safeguard, the only check on government discretion, is of a
political nature. The government decisions in question involve
such complex and specialized subjects that political checks are not
likely to operate effectively or evenly.
As will be indicated, there is room under the codes, and possi-
bly even under United States implementing legislation, for either
of these scenarios to develop.
A. The new international regime.
The MTN codes establish a much more pervasive set of interna-
tional rules than those which previously existed. 9 The codes
which have the greatest potential for developing a regime of law
governing national conduct are those on Technical Barriers to
Trade (Standards), Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Anti-
dumping, and Government Procurement. They appear to be based
on the assumption that governmental intervention in international
markets should be minimized, and that the system of rules might
help achieve this objective."
A rather different orientation appears in the codes on certain
agricultural products. They are concerned principally with estab-
lishing international mechanisms for governments to intervene in
markets, when necessary, to achieve stability. Each of the three
protocols to the International Dairy Arrangement, for example,
specifically calls on the participating nations "to ensure that the
"g For a more complete description of the codes discussed here, and the codes not dis-
cussed, see Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
" Other codes which have been agreed upon include the Code on Customs Valuation,
regularizing the system of evaluating imports for the purpose of imposing customs duties;
the Code 'on Import Licensing Procedures; the Code on Trade in Civil Aircraft; the Interna-
tional Arrangements on Dairy Products and Bovine Meats; and a catchall code on "Frame-
work" matters, the most significant part of which for our purposes is a "Draft Understan-
ding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance."
[Vol. 9:177
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export prices of the products defined ... shall not be less than the
minimum price"21 specified in the protocol. A special committee
reviews and modifies minimum price levels.' The Arrangement
also sets up an "International Dairy Products Council" to monitor
and evaluate market conditions and to devise solutions for any
"serious market disequilibrium" or threat thereof."3 At the same
time the Arrangement establishes this international price level
and administrative structure for other possible market-stabilizing
interventions, it calls for limitations on similar market interven-
tions by national governments, such as subsidies, safeguard
measures, and discriminatory technical standards." Thus the
Arrangement might be characterized for our present purposes as
tolerating-indeed sponsoring-government intervention in crit-
ical market decisions, though it attempts to coordinate the interven-
tion of individual nations through the international organization. 5
The non-agricultural codes mentioned above attempt to estab-
lish limitations on market interventions pursued by individual na-
tions. But unlike the agricultural codes, they do not substitute an
international body with authority to sponsor such interventions
and to make judgments concerning equitable prices to consumers,
adequate returns to producers, or methods for stabilizing
markets.
The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Code prohibits cer-
tain subsidies granted by nations specifically on their exports. It
calls for participating nations to avoid certain other subsidy prac-
tices which distort trade and injure producers in other countries,
and also attempts to regularize the use of countermeasures so
that they do not become trade barriers themselves. It calls for full
disclosure of subsidy practices and of countermeasures, so that
each participant can observe the compliance of the others. It also
provides an international process for resolving disputes and enforc-
ing compliance with the Code. Similar measures are established to
regulate countermeasures taken by nations to combat dumping
practices of foreign industries.
The Code on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards) is perhaps
the most novel and potentially far-reaching of all. It places each
" E.g., Protocol Regarding Certain Cheeses, Part Two, Art. 3, 1.
Id, 3.
" Part One, Art. IV, 2.
" Part One, Art. V.
The Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meats is similar in approach, though less far-
reaching in its regulatory impact.
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nation under an obligation to avoid product standards, testing re-
quirements, and certification systems that (1) are intended to
create obstacles to international trade, (2) in fact discriminate
against imported products, or (3) create "unnecessary obstacles to
international trade."26 Vast numbers of technical product stan-
dards and testing systems exist in any modern industrial society.
The Code requires national governments to ensure that their own
measures comply with the Code,27 and to use "such reasonable
methods as may be available to them" to achieve compliance of
technical standards established by state and local governments
and by private organizations.28 In order to achieve compliance
with the Code, technical standards are required to be published,
and open procedures are to be used in formulating new standards.
A dispute resolution procedure is also provided.
The Government Procurement Code is also distinctive and of
great potential significance. The other codes call on national
governments to desist from various kinds of intervention in
market decisions in a way that distorts trade from what it would
be according to comparative economic advantage. In the case of
government procurement, the government is conducting trade,
not intervening in or influencing the trade of others. The Govern-
ment Procurement Code places international rules on the conduct
of national governments in their own proprietary purchasing deci-
sions -decisions which have normally been highly discretionary.
The Code requires that participating governments use contract-
ing procedures that allow suppliers from other participating coun-
tries to compete effectively for the contracts. Specifications for
goods to be procured must be drawn in a nondiscriminatory way;
bid opportunities and rules for tendering bids must be published;
adequate time must be allowed for response from foreigners; and
losing bidders are entitled to information about the winning bid-
der and the reasons for the award made. The Code establishes a
procedure for resolving disputes between governments, but under
this code, unlike the others, individual business enterprises from
abroad will also be entitled to deal directly with the procuring
government's authorities and resolve disputes through negotia-
Art. 2.1, 7.1.
Art. 2, 5. 7. For a discussion of the applicability of the Code to a broad new system of
federal government control over chemicals entering United States commerce, see papers
delivered at the 1979 Annual Meeting of The American Society of International Law, Panel
on "International Control of Toxic Substances," April 26, 1979, to be published by the Soci-
ety in its proceedings of the meeting.
Art. 3, 4, 6, 8.
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tion.
At the outset, these codes are likely to introduce substantial
new uncertainties in the planning and conduct of United States
business at home and abroad. Lawyers will be called on to inter-
pret the new codes and give guidance on how they are likely to be
enforced.
Whether lawyers will be able to carry out this function effec-
tively will depend on the extent to which the new codes succeed in
establishing a system of rules which will constitute a basis for
making reasonably reliable predictions concerning national con-
duct and enforcement action. Legal guidance will not be feasible if
the codes serve instead as a set of ideals generally viewed as
unachievable in practice and functioning only as a starting point
for negotiation and compromise-with each controversy being
handled differently, the result depending not on systematic and
objective interpretation of the rule, but on the economic signifi-
cance of the particular dispute in question and the relative
economic and political power and circumstances of the nations in-
volved.
These uncertainties reflect perhaps the greatest ambiguity in
the new codes: just what is to be the status and function of the
codes themselves? Officials and businessmen from different coun-
tries have different attitudes on this question. Some feel that the
rules in the codes should be observed by the participating nations
in small cases and in large ones, and that long-term investments
and sophisticated trading patterns will develop only if business in
the various nations can predictably rely on observance of the
rules.3 Others view the rules more as though they were terms in a
" If the Government Procurement Code works effectively in practice, the use of similar
codes might present an approach to establishing reciprocity in trade with nations of the
Soviet Bloc and other state trading countries. At present, if a western nation grants tariff
concessions to a state trading country, the only way to achieve some rough reciprocity is to
receive an assurance from that country that it will purchase a specified amount of goods in
a specified time. This approach, if continued, is likely to draw the government of the
western nation increasingly into a commercial role, to see that the trade ledger remains
balanced over the years. However, if the state trading country were to agree to treat
western nation suppliers as equal competitors under transparent and enforceable purchas-
ing rules, as in the Procurement Code, then reciprocity could be achieved through competi-
tive forces. The role of the western government would be to see that its industry is treated
fairly under the rules, rather than to worry about commercial decisions.
"A major purpose of all the codes is to establish greater certainty regarding inter-
national rights and obligations. Clearly, whichever body administers the codes
should make its decisions on the basis of legal criteria and economic analysis,
rather than domestic political and foreign policy considerations." (Testimony of
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commercial agreement, which can be modified by the parties to
the agreement at any time and in response to whatever induce-
ments one may offer the other.
The former group is normally reluctant to have the government
involved in making commercial transactions. It feels that the
government's role should be limited to making and enforcing rules
within which diverse business entities decide on the business
transactions they wish to conduct. The latter group is more accus-
tomed to centralized decisionmaking and government participa-
tion in business transactions.3
The former or "rule oriented" group views disputes between
two or more countries concerning a code provision as an occasion
to clarify the rule, if possible, so that it will function better in the
future for the guidance of all. The latter or "power oriented"
viewpoint regards these disputes as occasion for commercial nego-
tiation between the governments, to be settled without too much
concern for how similar disputes might have been handled in the
past or might be handled in the future."
It is too early to attempt to predict how effectively each of the
new codes might function in establishing rules rather than merely
serving as a forum for continued bargaining. Some of the codes
have the potential for developing either way depending on the at-
titude of the participating nations.
The International Dairy Arrangement is, among the codes, the
Elizabeth V. Perkins of the United States Chamber of Commerce before the Sub-
committee on Trade of the Senate Finance Committee (U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, March 7, 1979) at 4-5.).
The following two recent examples illustrate a degree of government involvement in
commercial decisions not considered normal in the United States.
On April 9, 1979, The Wall Street Journal, at 12, col. 3, reported that
Societe Lorraine & Meridionale de Laminage, a French steelmaker, canceled an
order for a Sperry Rand Corp. Sperry Univac 1100-82 dual-processor computer
system valued at more than $6 million. The company, instead, turned to CII-
Honeywell Bull, which will sell one of its 66 systems....
Industry sources said the Univac order was canceled under strong pressure
from the French authorities....
On April 20, 1979, the Journal of Commerce, at 1, col. 5, reported that the French presi-
dent, after offering Ford Motor Co. subsidies to establish an assembly plant in France, indi-
cated that a French company might be selected instead. "He stressed that the government
would have to consider not only what was good for Lorraine but what was in 'the interests
of French industry' in making the decision."
2 The "power oriented" and "rule oriented" approaches are discussed in Jackson, supra,
note 1 at 98-101, where the author explains why "a particularly strong argument exists for
pursuing even-handedly and with a fixed direction the progress of international economic
affairs towards a rule oriented approach."
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most likely to develop as a mechanism for centralized governmen-
tal decisionmaking since it envisions several international commit-
tees with authority to regulate the minimum prices on specific
products.
The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and Antidumping
codes are designed to develop mechanisms for making and enforc-
ing rules, rather than for intergovernmental commercial bargain-
ing. Under these codes, the domestic industry of an importing
nation may petition that nation to investigate whether exporters
from another nation are receiving anticompetitive subsidies or
dumping products so as to injure the domestic industry. If an af-
firmative determination results, the importing nation can take
certain prescribed countermeasures to protect its domestic indus-
try. This investigation procedure, with prescribed criteria for im-
posing remedial tariffs, could regularize the government practices
of trading nations in these matters. Commercial activity could
take place in reliance on the boundaries of government interven-
tion established by the rules.
Under both codes, however, the importing nation is required to
consult with the exporting nation prior to initiating an investiga-
tion. Moreover, the codes provide that the importing nation may
terminate the investigation if certain undertakings as to prices,
quantities or subsidy amounts are made by the exporter. These
provisions create an opportunity for the importing nation to
bargain away its differences with the exporting nation, rather
than enforce rules against subsidies and dumping.
The Government Procurement and Technical Barriers to Trade
(Standards) codes both have the potential to function well as sys-
tems of rules, rather than as contexts for commercial bargaining.
Both codes require governments to conduct certain internal func-
tions openly and within a rather narrow range of discretion. Thus
they may be more readily enforceable as systems of rules than the
requirements of other codes.
The "transparency" provisions found in some of the codes might
assist in establishing a rule oriented approach. These provisions
require each participating government to make available to the
others full information concerning its activities in areas governed
by the codes. This information will help disclose noncompliance
and thus assist in holding countries accountable under the rules. 33
One proposed bill to implement the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
would require the responsible United States Government agency to publish a report at
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It will also help disclose compromises negotiated in lieu of compli-
ance. Such compromises may be more difficult when their terms
are known to others who might seek equivalent treatment.
The Code on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards) provides
that when a nation proposes a technical standard which will be ap-
plied to imported products, it must notify the other signatories to
the agreement and give them an opportunity to comment on the
proposed standard. Under the Subsidies and Countervailing Mea-
sures Code, any signatory may inquire of another concerning "the
nature and extent of any subsidy granted or maintained" by the
other which affects trade. All parties are entitled to notify the
GATT community of suspected subsidy practices of other parties.
The imposition of countervailing duties will only occur through
public proceedings in which the nation alleged to be involved in an
improper subsidy practice will have the opportunity to examine
the evidence and participate.
These transparency provisions will give lawyers an important
quasi-investigative role in assisting clients to analyze whether
foreign government behavior might have an adverse effect on the
client's competitive opportunities abroad or at home, assisting the
client in presenting demands that the United States Government
seek information from the foreign government, and assisting the
client and the Government to understand the significance of the
information received.
Another part of the codes that will have a very significant im-
pact on the development of a legal regime is the mechanism for
resolving disputes between participating countries concerning
their obligations under the codes. I defer this subject, however,
until we have considered the United States implementing legisla-
tion.
B. Domestic implementation of the codes.
Certainly the greatest need for the private lawyer's skills and
energies will be found in the programs by which the United States
Government implements internally the obligations it has under-
taken in the codes. We are told that the codes will not be self-
executing, that they will not authorize Executive Branch action or
impose obligations on private parties, and that such authorization
least twice a year "describing any practice engaged in by a foreign country which may con-
stitute a bounty or grant." S. 538, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S2061, S2065 (March
5, 1979).
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and obligations will flow only from legislation adopted by Con-
gress. This legislation will establish domestic programs which
will, in the judgment of Congress, carry out the nation's code obli-
gations. Implementation will thus be expressed in this legislation,
in administrative action, and-to a degree not yet evident-in
judicial review of administrative action.
Of course, the object of the implementing programs is not merely
to insure compliance with United States obligations. There is also
a need to insure that United States rights under the codes are
adequately enforced. These include the right to information about
foreign government activities, such as subsidy practices and
government contracting procedures; the right to invoke the inter-
national dispute resolution process for certain offending actions;
and the right to impose countermeasures under specified circum-
stances.
In legislating on countervailing duties and antidumping matters,
where there is substantial prior experience, Congress should be
able to set forth the responsibilities of the Executive Branch in
considerable detail, defining standards for administrative deci-
sions and specifying decisionmaking procedures more clearly than
was previously possible. If Congress demands more careful and
disciplined procedures in antidumping and countervailing duty
cases, the ability of lawyers to play a constructive role in these
proceedings will undoubtedly be enhanced. The administrative
decisionmakers should be required to keep a complete record of
all information received in their investigation and make it avail-
able to interested parties.' Unless a careful and complete record
is kept, it is simply not possible to distinguish clearly between
cases in which the agency makes an objective determination and
those in which it yields to political pressures or other parochial in-
terests. The agency should also be required to publish a written
explanation of its decisions, with explicit findings of fact and cita-
tions to the evidence relied on to support them. In a case challeng-
ing nontariff import restrictions on the ground that they were
adopted for political reasons and not in response to the criteria set
forth in the governing statute, the United States Court of Appeals
said that "a procedure not requiring an opportunity for oral pre-
' Confidential business information can be made available under protective orders such
as are commonly used in federal court litigation, including proceedings in the Customs
Court. Cust. Ct. R. 6.1(c)(7) and (8). Authority to fashion these orders in each case could rest
with the administrative agency involved, but sanctions for violating the orders could be im-
posed both by the agency and the court in which judicial review is available.
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sentation... on crucial matters, and not requiring evidence in the
record, is a seed bed for the weed of industry domination."' The
court held that when the administrative decisionmaker comes to
make factual determinations and legal conclusions, "he must think
in terms of support in evidence and general standards, and cannot
be guided solely by deference to industry desires. '
Implementation of one of the codes-on Technical Barriers to
Trade (Standards)- will involve, potentially, a brand new regula-
tory effort with potentially large consequences for major seg-
ments of United States industry. Most of the product standards
and test and certification systems in use in the United States are
established by state and local governments and by industry
groups. The scope and complexity of such standards and systems
are immense, including such items as local building codes and
health regulations, state laws on pressurized gas cylinders, and
product specifications of the telecommunications industry. It has
been suggested that Congress enact a blanket prohibition on all
such standards which create "unnecessary obstacles to interna-
tional trade," creating a civil right of action for injunctive relief in
federal courts for private parties as well as the federal govern-
ment. Attempting to comply with these new legal requirements,
United States business managers and their lawyers will be facing
difficulties not unlike those imposed by other major regulatory
programs in the past. What is "an unnecessary obstacle to inter-
national trade?" Should businesses operating under established
industrial standards undertake to review them and revise them
unilaterally? What will be the expense and inconvenience if they
are found to be in noncompliance? How does business ascertain
reliably what the requirement means? If the technical standard is
imposed by state or local law, how can a businessman find out
whether it complies with the new federal requirement or is in-
stead invalid? When a standard is ruled invalid, will a transition
period be allowed for the adaptation of industrial practices to new
technical standards? Are judges competent to examine the ex-
treme technicalities of a United States industrial standard and
ascertain whether, in the context of international competition, it
creates "an unnecessary obstacle?" 37
Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1016.
Such litigation would probably raise questions quite similar to those which the federal
courts have faced in cases under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), involving the question
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To ask these questions is not to imply that all the horrors sug-
gested are likely to occur. It is simply to suggest a large challenge
American lawyers will encounter in assisting their clients to cope
with this program.
C. Judicial review in United States courts.
The lawyer's role under the new codes and implementing legis-
lation will, of course, be affected significantly by the extent to
which the decisions of Executive Branch officials under these laws
will be subject to judicial review. As noted above, judicial review
of countervailing duty and antidumping determinations has in the
past been impaired by jurisdictional limitations to such a degree
that it was unavailable, as a practical matter, in most cases. The
proposed implementing legislation would remove some of these
jurisdictional limitations. First, review would be available in the
Customs Court as soon as administrative procedures have been
exhausted, rather than after the determination and assessment of
the duties and the filing and denial of a protest.' Second, ad-
ministrative decisions would be made on the basis of an ad-
ministrative record which includes all information submitted in
the course of the proceeding, all governmental memoranda
relating to the case, and records of all ex parte contacts. The
Customs Court would review administrative decisions under the
substantial evidence standard. Third, determinations not to in-
itiate an investigation would be subject to judicial review as well
as determinations made after an investigation.39
These legislative initiatives would be natural products of a con-
cern that has persisted for some years among members of Con-
gress, that the discretion of the Executive Branch must be confined
somewhat by enforceable statutory standards lest the Executive
go too far in trading off important priorities, established by Con-
gress pursuant to its explicit constitutional mandate, in response
to political or foreign policy pressures which the President feels
with particular intensity."0 But confining the President's discre-
whether an existing local regulation, which serves a legitimate purpose, is invalid because
an alternative might exist which imposes a less severe restriction on trade.
" See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., Ltd. v. U.S. Treas. Dep't, 67 Cust. Ct. 328 (1971),
aff'd, 485 F.2d 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
" See American Bar Association Resolution No. CV-8-76-S13, Report No. 124 (Aug. 1976)
(ABA internal reference).
o The great discretionary power over the welfare of business enterprises presently en-
joyed by the Treasury Department under antidumping and countervailing duty laws in the
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tion in decisions regulating international trade has been some-
what more difficult than in decisions that merely affect domestic
commerce, since the courts traditionally were quite reluctant to
give close scrutiny to Executive Branch decisions affecting
foreign relations."' Thus, the proposed expansion of judicial power
is necessary if Congress wants reassurance that the policies it
establishes will be carried out.
D. The international dispute resolution mechanism.
Certainly the greatest influence over the next few years on the
development of a legal regime governing international trade will
be the international dispute resolution process that is established,
in an embryonic fashion, in some of the new codes. If it evolves in
one direction, this process could strengthen the development of
legal principles and rules for the guidance of nations and individ-
uals in planning future conduct. However, the mechanisms estab-
lished in the codes are so rudimentary that it is entirely possible
that the dispute settlement process will function not to develop
and strengthen rules, but to provide an escape from them into ad
hoc compromises applicable only to individual situations and based
on the political and economic trade-offs of the moment.
Since the United States economy will be increasingly tied to
those of other nations, the direction in which the international
legal regime evolves will have a great influence on the degree to
which effective and reliable rules can be established and enforced
in the domestic legal system. Clearly stated and enforceable inter-
national rules will reinforce the development of domestic rules
that guide the United States economy in a fashion consistent with
absence of effectively available judicial review is analogous to that which the same Depart-
ment held until recently under the penalty provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1592. Treasury could im-
pose enormous penalties for alleged import infractions, and then agree to mitigate them
under procedures which then precluded the importer from securing judicial review of the
government's action. See Gerhart, note 12 supra at 1101, 1130-35; Herzstein, The Need to
Reform Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 10 INT'L LAWYER 285 (1976). Congress
remedied this situation in response to the urging of the American Bar Association and
various business groups. Pub. L. No. 95-410, Oct. 3, 1978.
" One prominent example of judicial deference to the Executive Branch in international
trade matters is the recent statement by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals that the
Secretary of Treasury has a "wide latitude" within which he "may determine the existence
or non-existence of a bounty or grant" under the countervailing duty statute, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209, 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1977), aff'd 437
U.S. 443 (1978). See also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36, 38 (1945); Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (courts will defer to State Department suggestion
whether a foreign nation has the right to claim sovereign immunity in a particular case).
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international expectations. But if international rules leave room
for broad discretion in the actions of other countries, there will be
strong practical pressures to leave broad discretionary power in
the hands of our own government, to permit it to cope with the
shifting behavior of other nations.
In 1978, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution urg-
ing
the United States Government to seek, during the current trade
negotiations in Geneva, reform of the procedures for resolving
disputes between nations concerning the application or interpre-
tation of internationally agreed rules for the conduct of trade
between nations, such reforms to be achieved through an inter-
national agreement creating a new set of procedures which in-
clude the following features:
The procedure should place great reliance on an adjudication by
an impartial panel;
All adjudications should result in a reasoned opinion which will
be published, to insure that the opinions can be subjected to
informed criticism and can serve as precedents for future
world trade practices;
The procedure should be understandable to the public, and
should contain provisions which guarantee its integrity and
impartiality, so that public and political acceptance of it will
steadily increase; .... 42
In 1976 a study panel of the American Society of International
Law had recommended a uniform dispute resolution procedure for
disputes under all codes, emphasizing use of impartial tribunals,
published reports which "can become a part of a growing body of
jurisprudence ... as a means of guidance for future conduct of na-
tions and as a means of bringing particular international trade
problems to the attention of the international community ... "
The study panel suggested that complaints be initiated not only
by individual participating nations but also by an international
secretariat or by the executive council of a world trade organiza-
tion.,8
The dispute resolution system set forth in the new codes falls
far short of these goals, though it can be viewed as a modest start
" ABA Resolution No. IC-2-78-S16B, Report No. 102 (Aug. 1978) (ABA internal refer-
ence).
" PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, RE-MAKING THE SYSTEM OF WORLD TRADE: A PROPOSAL FOR INSTITU-
TIONAL REFORM 33-35 (ASIL Studies in Transnational Legal Policy No. 12, 1976).
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which, if carefully and conscientiously developed by the partici-
pating nations, could grow into a system which enhances and rein-
forces the international legal regime.
Although almost all of the codes have separate dispute resolu-
tion systems, the procedures employed in each are largely the
same. The first stage in resolving a dispute is consultation between
the interested nations. If the dispute is not resolved through con-
sultation, the complaining party may raise the issue with the com-
mittee established to administer the code under which the dispute
has arisen. Should the committee fail to resolve the dispute
through conciliation between the parties, it would then convene a
panel to investigate the matter, consult with the interested par-
ties and prepare a statement of facts and a recommended ruling.
The panel would be composed of three to five individuals of
diverse backgrounds who would not sit as representatives of their
governments. No member of the panel may be a citizen of a nation
interested in the dispute. The panel would submit first its factual
findings and subsequently its conclusions to the concerned parties
prior to submitting either document to the committee." By allow-
ing the concerned parties to examine these documents first, it is
hoped that they would agree to a resolution of the dispute prior to
presentation of the panel's report to the full committee."
After the panel has reported to the committee, the committee
would issue its own statement concerning the facts of the dispute
and its recommendation for corrective action. If the party to
which the recommended action is directed is unable to comply, it
must submit written reasons to the committee, which would then
consider what other action to take."
How will the lawyer for business enterprises function under
" The timetable for panel decisions under the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Code is much tighter than under other agreements. The panel must be established within
thirty days after the dispute has been raised before the committee and must report back to
the committee within sixty days after its establishment. Under most other codes, the panel
must be established within three months after the dispute is presented to the committee
and may take as much time as is reasonable under the circumstances to reach a decision,
although six months is generally suggested.
"' The committee which administers the Code on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards)
may choose, instead of forming a panel, to refer technical questions involved in the dispute
to a technical expert group. As with a panel, no member of the technical expert group may
represent his respective government and none is a citizen of one of the interested nations.
The technical expert group will examine the matter, consult with the concerned parties and
submit factual findings and conclusions as to the technical issues to the committee.
" In addition to the resolution procedures for disputes among concerned parties, the Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures and Antidumping codes each provide a mechanism for
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this system? At this stage, perhaps the best approach to this ques-
tion is to ask a series of further questions:
1. Counseling clients: Will the decisions resulting from the in-
ternational dispute resolution process function effectively as con-
straints on the actions of the United States and other countries?
2. Taking action against foreign government violations: Will
there be a procedure by which private business entities or labor
organizations can complain, in the international forum, about na-
tional government practices which distort trade and appear to be
inconsistent with one of the codes? The dispute resolution mecha-
nisms established in the new codes provide no such procedure.
Perhaps it will be feasible some day, when confidence in the objec-
tivity and competence of the international forum is greater.
When it appears that foreign government action is contrary to
an international code and affects American interests: how will the
United States Government decide whether to initiate interna-
tional dispute resolution procedures?
The Senate Subcommittee on International Trade has stated
that:
[albsent effective use of the dispute settlement apparatus by the
United States, adherence to some of the codes by the United
States could lead to minimal, uncertain, or perhaps harmful
results."'
Under the implementing legislation, the President's Special
Trade Representative (STR) will be authorized to recommend that
the President take action under a revised version of section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974 to enforce United States rights under the
new codes and the GATT articles generally. Any interested party
an importing nation to investigate whether its domestic industry is being injured or is
threatened with injury from an exporting nation's improper subsidy or from an exporter's
dumping practices. Under its own law, the importing nation may undertake an investiga-
tion into a suspected subsidy or dumping practice which may injure domestic industry. The
codes require that the investigation must consider simultaneously two principal issues:
whether an improper subsidy or dumping practice exists and whether it injures or threat-
ens to injure domestic industry. The investigation must be public and the interested na-
tions and private enterprises must have an opportunity to examine all nonconfidential
evidence and make their own submissions. In addition, the codes lay down strict standards
for determining the amount and the starting date of any countervailing or dumping duties
which may be imposed. Thus, internal self-help measures within specified limits are author-
ized under these codes, as well as international complaint mechanisms. Both can proceed
simultaneously.
1 Senate Finance Subcomm. on International Trade, Press Release No. H-5, at 4 (Feb. 8,
1979).
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will be able to file a complaint with the STR setting forth foreign
government conduct which it believes is inconsistent with code
obligations. The STR will be required to respond within a brief
time period, such as 45 days, by either commencing a section 301
proceeding or stating the reasons why it has decided not to do
SO.48
Is the STR decision wholly discretionary? Will it be subject to
judicial review in any respect? What are the considerations which
the responsible Government official should, and should not, take
into account? Is the official free to decide that the United States
will not complain internationally, even in the face of a clear-cut
violation by a foreign government, because of extraneous political
or economic considerations affecting United States relations with
that government? Or, alternatively, must he decide to file a com-
plaint when it appears to be meritorious, even though it appears
likely that the act of complaining will bring forth serious economic
or political consequences adversely affecting United States inter-
ests?
If the international dispute resolution process is unavailable or
ineffective, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 will still authorize
the President to impose unilateral sanctions when he determines
that a foreign country is unjustifiably or unreasonably burdening
United States commerce. Sanctions include withdrawal of trade
concessions previously made and imposition of new duties or im-
port restrictions on products of the foreign country. It appears
that the decision whether to impose these sanctions will remain
highly discretionary within the Executive Branch and will con-
tinue, as in the past, to be significantly affected by the general
state of economic and political relations with the foreign govern-
ment.
3. Taking action against the United States Government viola-
tions: When a foreign country or industry is aggrieved by conduct
of the Government that might be inconsistent with code obli-
gations, a lawyer for United States import interests or foreign
producer interests might play some role in asking or assisting the
officials of the foreign government to present a complaint in the
international forum against United States action. One is prompted
to speculate on whether the foreign government officials would
welcome representation by private lawyers urging that a com-
, H.R. 4537, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 901 (1979) (revising section 301 and adding section
302 to the Trade Act of 1974).
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plaint not be filed. Such representations might come, for example,
from United States producers or from consumer or importer in-
terests in the foreign country which benefit from the imports.
Presentations to the government by such interests are common in
the United States.
4. Presenting facts and arguments to the international panel:
Once an international dispute resolution proceeding has been com-
menced, to what extent will private lawyers for the affected
business interests on both sides be allowed to participate in the
proceedings? Will they be permitted to work along with the offi-
cials of the United States Government, and the foreign govern-
ment, who are acting for their countries in the proceeding? Will
all the pertinent information possessed by the government be
made available to them? Will they be consulted on the factual evi-
dence and length of argument to be presented? Will they be allowed
to submit to the international forum, perhaps through their
government channels, evidence and arguments of their own in ad-
dition to those presented by the government?'9
5. Effect on United States law: How will our domestic law be in-
fluenced by interpretations of the codes in the international
forum? Presumably Congress, in the implementing legislation, is
mandating Executive Branch action along lines which the Govern-
ment presently views as being consistent with United States obli-
gations under the codes.1 What will happen if the United States
administration, acting under the implementing legislation, im-
poses, for example, countervailing duties on certain imports, and
this action is upheld by domestic courts as consistent with the
statute, but the international dispute resolution procedure results
in a determination that the United States action is inconsistent
When the United States Government is a party in the domestic courts, private inter-
ests affected by the outcome of the case are allowed to intervene, become parties to the
case, and submit evidence and arguments in addition to those presented by the govern-
ment. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
For example, the definition of subsidy in the proposed implementing legislation in-
cludes all of the export subsidies described in the Annex (Illustrative List of Export Sub-
sidies) to the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures plus the same types of
domestic subsidies as are described in article 11 of the Code. H.R. 4537, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 101 (1979) (adding section 771(5) to the Tariff Act of 1930). The proposed implemen-
ting legislation also sets forth a procedure for investigating subsidy complaints which
follows the Code in requiring that information submitted in the investigation, with few ex-
ceptions, be available to all parties and that investigation simultaneously consider the two
issues of whether a subsidy exists and whether it injures domestic industry. H.R. 4537,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1979) (adding sections 702, 703, 705 and 777 to the Tariff Act of
1930).
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with the code? It does not appear that Congress will authorize the
Executive then to change its interpretation of United States law.
It will be necessary to seek new legislation, to negotiate with the
aggrieved foreign nations some reprieve for the offending United
States conduct, or to suffer sanctions that may be imposed on the
United States under the code. Present indications are that Con-
gress will make permanent the President's authority to negotiate
agreements concerning nontariff barriers and other trade distor-
tions contained in Section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974, and will
also continue the "fast track" legislative method for approving
and implementing such agreements contained in Section 151.
Thus, when the need arises to alter United States law to make a
practice consistent with international decisions, these procedures
can be utilized.
E. Continuing negotiating authority.
If Congress does authorize the President to engage in further
negotiations on nontariff matters, such negotiations could be used
by the participating nations to clarify and improve the codes
recently agreed upon, to establish new codes for other areas of
divergent national conduct which impairs the flow of trade, and to
improve the dispute resolution process. The continuing negotia-
tions can also, of course, be used to work out ad hoc solutions for
individual industry problems, such as market sharing agreements
or minimum import price mechanisms. Though such agreements
may be useful or necessary in occasional situations, their wide-
spread use would diminish the significance of general legal rules
as a framework in which individual commercial decisions are
made, and would instead substitute regimes of continuing ad-
ministrative control over the course of commerce.
IV. CONCLUSION
The private lawyer's role in international trade decisionmaking
in the past has involved, in large part, efforts to influence Execu-
tive Branch action which was highly discretionary under United
States law and subject to very few international constraints.
There has been little opportunity for lawyers to participate, as
they often do elsewhere in the American legal system, in the
development of a reasonably reliable framework of legal prin-
ciples and rules within which private businesses were free to plan
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and carry out long-range commercial programs.
The broadly discretionary role of the federal government in
making decisions with vast impact on private international trade
has been unsatisfactory in several respects. It has deprived busi-
nesses of the reliability and predictability they need for long-
range business programs that commit large amounts of investment
capital and affect the destiny of large number of workers. And it
has brought government into a more active role in commercial
decisionmaking-who can buy and who can sell, in what quantity
and at what prices -than is regarded as customary or desirable in
the United States.
It has also raised a serious question concerning the legitimacy
of government action. To the extent that private economic activ-
ity is to be regulated, the United States Constitution places
responsibility for such regulation in the Congress, and the Presi-
dent's role is to execute such laws as Congress may adopt."
American businesses, workers, and consumers do not view their
President as having a claim to any special understanding or com-
petence in commercial decisions, either domestic or international.
His political accountability is not sufficiently great to provide
satisfactory public control over decisions he might make that
directly alter patterns of business activity. Thus Executive
Branch decisions regulating international trade have in significant
instances been perceived as unfairly depriving workers of their
jobs, unfairly increasing prices to consumers, or depriving busi-
nesses of the legitimate rewards of their investment and enter-
prise. They have been seen by both domestic industry and import
groups as trade-offs of commercial interests for political interests,
a process which is not per se improper, but which is unacceptable
when the decisionmaker is not viewed as adequately understand-
ing the commercial interests involved. The result is a loss of con-
fidence in government, and a spread of the attitude that politics
and power are more important than good economic performance in
determining commercial success.
The only way to avoid further drift in this direction is to work
steadily at building a system of rules governing Executive Branch
" The President's power to regulate foreign commerce is largely limited to the authority
granted him by Congress. Where Congress has enacted legislation affecting foreign com-
merce, the President may act under his power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted." U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. Otherwise, the President may act in the area of foreign
commerce where Congress has specifically delegated powers to him by statute. See L.
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 54-56, 94-107 (1972).
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decisions in international trade-rules which have a strong claim
to legitimacy. The rules will be so perceived when (1) they are pro-
duced by the political process, through Congress, (2) they are suf-
ficiently clear to provide predictability in private commercial
programs, and (3) they are applied through disciplined administra-
tive procedures and are subject to meaningful judicial review to
insure objective application and consistent interpretation.
Some might argue that this is precisely the wrong direction to
move in; that we are already subject to too many laws and con-
siderably overlawyered. More rules, they will observe, mean more
complexity, burdening business with the continuing overhead and
delays of regulation. They would urge that government decisions
regulating international trade should not be less discretionary but
more so, as is the case in many foreign nations, including not just
the state trading countries but also Japan and some of the coun-
tries of Western Europe.
This argument presents a basic policy choice of immense magni-
tude for United States business and the American people. It in-
volves a shift of power over commercial activity and decisionmaking
from diverse private hands to centralized governmental authority.
Though such a move would at first affect only international trad-
ing decisions, it would ultimately affect domestic commercial deci-
sions also, in view of the increasing integration of the United
States and international economies. Since American business is a
highly sophisticated and complex organism, a system of discre-
tionary regulation is likely to lead to bureaucratic complexities
which exceed those involved in regulation under legal rules. Even
complex bureaucratic regulation could not be subtle and flexible
enough for the needs of the present business system, and would
end up slowing and burdening economic activity. For these rea-
sons, a move to greater government discretion over international
trading arrangements is too fundamental a choice to be made by
drift and without full public appreciation for the consequences.
In the absence of such a basic alteration in the relative roles of
government and private decisionmaking in commercial activity,
the American public and Congress will no doubt continue to ex-
pect that the relationship in international commerce will be much
like that which prevails in domestic commerce. Decisions of
government officials would then be distinctly limited by legal
standards, and the standards would be enforceable not just by
political processes but by judicial review available to parties
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adversely affected. Less government, in this context, means more
laws and-yes-a greater role for lawyers. The lawyers' role, ulti-
mately, will be to insure that legislative standards are adequate,
that administrative procedures fully reveal the facts and reason-
ing upon which official government decisions are based, and that
judicial review is rigorous and meaningful. Lawyers for the pri-
vate sector are guardians of the lines of official accountability.
They have been fulfilling this function for years in regard to
domestic commerce. The new trade agreements, reflecting and
amplifying the dramatic scope of United States involvement in the
world economy, will provide the opportunity for them to perform
the same salutary work in connection with international com-
merce.

